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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
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undersigned counsel for Defendant/Appellee represent that the named parties, Linda
Munford and Maiiusz Bienkowski, are and have been the only parties to this litigation.
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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appealfromafinalorder of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County issued by the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki. Linda Munford, the Plaintiffappellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, moved this appeal over to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(2)(j).
H.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki abused his discretionary power in denying
Plaintiff-appellant's Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and Order?
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
(1)

The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue
appears to be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion when it
denied Ms. Munford Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and Order. Young v.
Western Piling and Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394, (Utah 1984).
m.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

The Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations, whose
interpretation is determinative in the instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the
appropriate citation in the body and arguments of the instant brief.

IV,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

BACKGROUND HISTORY

The Defendant-Appellee came to Salt Lake City from Poland six years ago. He works
two jobs; eight hours a day at Utah Bank Note and eight hours a day at Little America Hotel. He
and Plaintiff-Appellant Linda Munford lived together for about \lh years. Subsequently, Mr.
Bienkowski discovered that Ms. Munford was opening joint charge accounts in Mr.
Bienkowski's name. Ms. Munford used those credit cards up to their respective limits, without
Mr. Bienkowski's knowledge. Ms. Munford failed to make the minimum required monthly
payments. Mr. Bienkowski discovered their existence when he was contacted at work regarding
those overdue accounts. Upon the discovery of Ms. Munford's fraudulent conduct, he moved out
of the apartment that they shared.
Initially when he moved out, he could not take all of his personal property, as he had
nowhere to store it. However, once he had made the appropriate arrangements for storage, he
returned to pick up his personal property. At that time, Plaintiff-Appellant Ms. Munford told him
that he could not retrieve the property, and that the only way he could have his own personal
property, was if he returned to live with her. Mr. Bienkowski then left the apartment. Ms.
Munford, the Plaintiff-Appellant, then began to follow Mr. Bienkowski everywhere especially to
his two places of employment, as well as stalking his family. As a result of this conduct by Ms.
Munford, Mr. Bienkowski filed for a protective order from the Third District Court. Following
this action, Ms. Munford filed for a protective order. Both orders were granted. Ms. Munford
continued to follow and shadow Mr. Bienkowski and the other members of his family.
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Subsequently, Ms. Munford was charged with embezzlement of funds from her
employer(s) and was convicted of Theft, a third degree felony. While serving time in the Salt
Lake County Jail as a result of that conviction, Plaintiff-Appellant learned that she would be
eligible for release with an ankle bracelet, if among other requirements, there were no protective
order in place against her. She then contacted Mr. Bienkowski's attorney, Martin Pezely,
requesting that a settlement agreement and an order be drawn up. This settlement agreement was
and is a compromise between the parties. He was to receive some of his property back and
receive some payment on her credit card debt done in his name. He, further, was to give up his
claims for the remainder of her credit card debt. She and he were to receive dismissals of the
respective protective orders, although Mr. Bienkowski did not care whether the protective order
against him was released or not since he had no desire to come in contact with PlaintiffAppellant. Mr. Bienkowski the Defendant-Appellee did have the protective order released
against Plaintiff-Appellant. Ms. Munford, after her release from jail, refused to return Mr.
Bienkowski's personal property, nor make any payment toward her credit card debt in Mr.
Bienkowski's name.
B. HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT PROCEEDINGS IN LITIGATION
Ms. Munford, through her attorney filed an action in Third District Court claiming the
ownership of Mr. Bienkowski's automobile. The Plaintiff-Appellant also filed an action in small
claims court and received a partial judgment in small claims court. Mr. Bienkowski appealed the
small claims judgment, through his newly retained attorney, Martin Pezely. Mr. Pezely also filed
an answer and counterclaim to the automobile claim. In February 2000, Mr. Pezely was
3

contacted by Ms. Munford and requested that he prepare a settlement agreement, such that she
could be released from jail. Mr. Pezely prepared the settlement agreement, pursuant to terms
given by Ms. Munford. At her direction, he took the settlement agreement to the Oxbow Jail,
where she was incarcerated. He was asked to leave the document for her review, which he did.
He later returned and picked up the executed document. After Mr. Bienkowski performed his
portion of the settlement agreement, the withdrawal of the protective order and relinquishment of
his counterclaim, allowing Ms. Munford to be released from jail, Ms. Munford refused to comply
with the terms of her own settlement agreement. She then filed a motion to set aside her own
settlement agreement. Judge Iwasaki heard the motion, which was argued by her new attorney
Rex Bushman and J. Kent Holland for Mr. Bienkowski. Mr. Holland was retained when it
became apparent, that Mr. Bienkowski's attorney, Martin Pezely, would be a necessary witness
to the terms of the settlement agreement and the conditions surrounding said settlement. After
hearing argument, Judge Iwasaki ruled from the bench that the Settlement Agreement was
enforceable and that Ms. Munford had not met the necessary burden to set aside the settlement
Agreement, the settlement agreement she had requested and set the terms thereof.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of Plaintiff-Appellant.
The evidence presented in Court was totally insufficient to warrant the granting of PlaintiffAppellant Motion to Set Aside Stipulation. The Plaintiff-Appellant Linda Munford alleged to the
Court that she had signed the stipulated settlement agreement because she was under duress. This
duress that she claimed, was due to act or acts of the Defendant-Appellee. However, Plaintiff4

Appellant was unable to provide any evidence to support her allegation. The three elements
necessary to support the claim of duress in order to avoid a contract, namely:
(1)

harmful acts perpetrated by the Defendant-Appellee

(2)

such acts causing fear in Plaintiff-Appellant

(3)

such that she was compelled to perform acts against her will

were nevei si lpported with ei lough evidei ice to sustaii I then existence in this case.
Plaintiff-Appellant alluded to the harmful act or action of the Defendant-Appellee in that
he wanted the return, of certain personal property, whicl 11 le belie\ es to be his. Oils desire foi the
return of his property is alleged as harmful by the Plaintiff-Appellee in that she views it as
immoral. Her allegation of immorality is based the fact that she was incarcerated and therefore,
in distress; and that the Defendant-Appellee took advantage of her situation. However,
Defendant-Appellee asserts that he was contacted by his own counsel with a request from the

wanted to settle all of their outstanding issues: protective orders, lawsuits, and unresolved
personal property issues. Cleai ly Defendai it Appellee's desire to retail i his ai uomofc ile upon
which he has made all of the payments, and to have his personal property returned, including
pictures of his deceased father, is not a "harmful'' or an "immoral" act. Whereas, tfr r .untiffAppellant may have had good reason to want a release of jail, there is no standard of duress that
can be assigned to Mr. Bienkowski, Defendant-Appellee. He did not cause her to be in jail, her
own dishonest acti< >n<; c *aused 1 ier to be placed in jail. Ihis settlement agreement came into
existence because - ! laintiff-Appellant's need or desire to be released from jail, an
incarcei atioi I of I: i

doing
5
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ARGUMENT

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI RULED PROPERLY IN DENYING THE
MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LINDA MUNFORD, AND
THUS DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETIONARY POWER.
This Court must review the District Court's decision to deny the Plaintiff-Appellant's
motion under the abuse of discretion standard. The question being, was the evidence presented in
support of the motion sufficiently so compelling such that the motion should have been granted.
Defendant-Appellee is convinced that when the Court has become thoroughly acquainted with all
the evidence in this case and all the reasonable inferences that can be drawn there from, the
Court will conclude that the District Court did nor misuse or abuse its discretionary power in
denying the Plaintiff-Appellant's motion, but simply applied Utah law in denying the motion for
lack of sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Judge Iwasaki's ruling was clearly erroneous.
Clearly, it is the duty of the Plaintiff-Appellant to marshal sufficient evidence to clearly
show that the underlying stipulation agreed to by both parties should be voided. In the case of
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., 894 P.2d 1270 (Utah App.1995), this
Court quoted an earlier case,
" '[t] he mere fact that a contract is entered into
under stress or pecuniary necessity is insufficient
[to constitute duress].' " Horgan v. Industrial
Design Corp. 657 P. 2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982)
(quoting Retail Clerks Health & Welfare Trust
Funds v. Shopland Supermarkets, Inc., 96 Wash.2d
939, 640 P. 2d 1051, 1054 (1982)
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This case clearly demonstrates that the fact that this Settlement Agreement w a s entered into at a
stressful time for M s . Munford is not sufficient to overturn the ruling of Judge Iwasaki.
In fact, in an earlier Utah ruling, the court put forth three considerations necessary for the
invalidation of a contract on tl le groin ids c I d\ iress. Fox vs. Pericey, 227 P. 2d 763 (Utah 1951).
These considerations are:
(1).

Tl: lat tl ite otl ler contracting pai !:> perfoi n is a 1 vi ongfi il or 1 lai n ifi il act

(2)

such that the other party is in fear

(3)

such fear as to compel that party to act against his will

The Plaintiff-Appellant contends that she signed the stipulation under duress and as such the
stipulation should have been voided. By the denial of her motion, Judge Iwasaki obviously
]

recognized the stress

••

!

- c m g in jail but disagreed that this stress constituted the

duress necessary to void the settlement agreement prepared at her request and terms. For
Phiniltft Appellant I" p m .ill ""i1 Mil*, uppciil t l v PLunlil) AppHkwil must p««'vulr d e a r ^ . n l n i c e
sufficient to satisfy the above-cited three considerations to establish that the stipulation was
indeed signed under duress. Simply stating that she felt nuclei di ii ess is not sufficient evidence to
demonstrate such duress.
1.

WAS A WRONGFUL OR HARMFUL ACT PERFORMED BY THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE?

The Plaintiff-Appellant put forth no evidence in either the District Court trial or the Appellate
Cotii t Iii ief of ai :iy acti ml 1: iiai i: i ifi ill act Ii iste ad. I Ma..li itiff Appellant puts forth the argument that
the requirement of a wrongful act may be met if the Defendant-Appellee performed an act
wrongful in tl le i noral sense (See Brief of Petition, page 13 pai agi aph 3) 1 1 le ease cited by
7

Plaintiff-Appellant, Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. vs. Alyseka Pipeline Service Co., 584 P .2d,
(Alaska 1978) 9 A.I.R. 4th 928, defeats her own argument. In that case the Alaska Court stated,
'The assertion of duress must be proven that the duress
resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive conduct
and not by the plaintiffs necessities."
The supposedly immoral act performed by the Defendant-Appellee is that he wanted a
settlement of all outstanding issues between both parties, and the return of his own personal
property. Certainly the fact that the Plaintiff-Appellant was incarcerated and her daughter was ill
would have caused the Plaintiff-Appellant considerable distress {id. Page 13 paragraph 2) and
could place her in self-imposed state of anxiety or duress, but this is not due to any action
performed by the Defendant-Appellee. Defendant-Appellee did not perform the acts, nor had any
part in the acts that sent Plaintiff-Appellant to jail or which caused Plaintiff-Appellant's daughter
to become ill.
Plaintiff-Appellant asserts that "courts will not enforce a bargain where one party was
unconscionably taken advantage of the distress of the other", Inman vs. Clyde Hall Drilling Co.,
369 P.2d 498, (Alaska 1962) 4 A.L.R. 3d 430. Again this assertion is not applicable here. First, it
should be recalled that the Plaintiff-Appellant made the initial contact to begin settlement
discussions. See Affidavit Martin J. Pezely, paragraph 4). Tr. 000087. Plaintiff-Appellant had
fired her attorney, Mr. Ludlow, allowing her to personally make contact with DefendantAppellee's counsel directly. See Affidavit Martin J. Pezely, paragraph 3 Tr. 000087.

Thereafter

Plaintiff-Appellant expressed what she wanted in the settlement agreement and it was presented
to her for her review and changes. See Affidavit Martin J. Pezely, paragraph 5 and 6 Tr. 00008788. Plaintiff-Appellant signed the Settlement Agreement Tr. 000079 as prepared and made no
8

changes. See Affidavit Martin J. Pezely, paragraph 8 Tr. 000088. Even though PlaintiffAppellant contends that she "had the stipulation documents for about five minutes" and that
"they were not in my possession for several hours" See Reply Affidavit of Linda Munford
paragrar

- " Tr.0001.02, she did not hesitate to quickly sigi i. these (loci iments.

The reason for execution of these documents was not alleged duress supposedly imposed
h\ I>efeiiclctiit • \|i|irllri , 1ml

I.'IIIMI

I 11 the i< J V

HIS

sialyl h\ (he N.imtitf- A p p r l L n l 1 Iin n\\n

words: "Not only was I awaiting hoped for release from the suffering of incarceration, but my
daughter was having serious health problems" See Reply Affidavit of Linda Munford paragraph 9
Tr.000101-102. While it is understandable that these concerns may cause the Plaintiff-Appellant
a high degree of anxiety, these concerns in no way constitute any element of duress alleged by
Plaintiff -Appellant
Thus in light of the above, Defendant-Appellee asserts that Plaintiff-Appellant has failed

the Plaintiff-Appellant in this matter.
2.

WAS THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN FEAR?

The issue is whether or not the alleged fear held by the Plaintiff-Appellant is of the kind
necessary to constitute an element of duress. Defendant-Appellee asserts that any alleged fear felt by
the Plaintiff-Appellant was not caused by any wrong, harmful, or immoral act by him. Certainly,
Plaintiff-Appellant may be fearful of remaining in jail, and she was may be fearful of the serious

Defendant-Appellee, but rather to actions taken by the Plaintiff-Appellant to cause her incarceration.

9

before I could leave jail" See Reply Affidavit of Linda Munford paragraph 10 Tr.000102 and
arguably she could be in fear that if the protective order were not dismissed she would remain
incarcerated. However the protective order obtained by Mr. Bienkowski Defendant-Appellee was
issued due to actions of the Plaintiff-Appellant and not due to actions of the Defendant-Appellee.
3.

WAS THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN SUCH FEAR AS TO
COMPEL HER TO ACT AGAINST HER WILL?

Plaintiff-Appellant has produced no evidence of such compelling fear having been caused by
actions of the Defendant-Appellee. Without question the Plaintiff-Appellant may be in fear of not
being released from jail and without question that release would not occur without the dismissal of
Defendant-Apppellant Protective Order. However, the Defendant-Appellant did not wish to dismiss
the protective order for fear of his safety and peace of mind, but was willing to do so to achieve what
he wanted, which was the return of his personal property and closure to this matter. See Reply to
Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and Order Tr. 000069-73. Likewise it is obvious that PlaintiffAppellant did not wish to give up her claim to certain personal property, but was ready to do so to
achieve what she wanted, release from jail. This is exactly what a settlement agreement is: each
party giving up something that they don't want to give up in order to receive something they desire.
Clearly, Plaintiff-Appellant initiated the settlement agreement. She had significant input into the
actual verbiage of the agreement and had an opportunity to review and change the document. She
signed the document in the presence of a notary and with no outward signs of coercion or duress.
At this stage, the only conclusion which a reasonable person could draw, is that the PlaintiffAppellant effected her release from jail by the execution of this document and that now that she has
what she wanted, freedom, she wished to abrogate the Settlement Agreement.
10

Thus, Defendant-Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff-Appellant has been unable to marshal any
evidence to sustain her claim for duress.

vn.

CONCLUSION

There was no evidence presented by M s Munibrd to tlenioiisfcitc thai liidiie Iw;isaki\ ruling
was clearly erroneous and therefore an abuse of his discretion. This is required. This Court stated in
Eh i i I'm • v M 7 ! Enter} m st -s I m • , 968 P.2d 861 (I Jtal :i - Ipj > 1998),
M.T. next appeals the trial court's determination that
the payment Agreement was not signed under duress.
In order to successfully attack factual findings, "(a) n
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then in support as to be ' against the
clear weight of the e v i d e n c e , ' thus making them
'clearly erroneous.' In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P. 2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989)
There was ample evidence to show that the Settlement Agreement was the idea of Ms.
Munford and that M s . Munford established the terms. Plaintiff -Appellant and Defendant-Appellee
entered into a stipulated Settlement Agreement and both signed in front of a notary. Both entered the
agreement to resolve issues between the parties and put this matter to rest. Both Parties gave up claims

of the three basic requirements necessary for the type of duress required to set aside the Settlement

not an abuse of discretionary power by Judge Iwasaki, but was well founded in the principles of Utah
law.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of January 2001.

it Holland
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 18th day of January 2001,1 caused to served two true and
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE'S MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI by
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Linda Munford
ProSe
5242 Cobblecreek Road # 11 H
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

HAND DELIVERED

Jnon Santiago
Paralegal for J. Kent Holland
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